This article is part of the October 2026 edition of the Syria Monthly Economic Digest. Click here to explore the full edition.

Picture from the Syria-Chinese Forum held on November 3-4. *Credit: SANA.*

Key Developments: A meeting at the Damascus Chamber of Commerce on October 7 turned into a list of grievances against the Syrian-Chinese Business Council (SCBC), as traders raised concerns about business visas to China, high membership fees, the council’s focus on large investors over small and medium firms, and the absence of any banking channel between the two countries. Council chairman Fadi Ahmad al-Muhaimid denied that the council had obtained a single business visa since its creation, whether through letters of recommendation or any other route, and said the file was frozen at the consular level, adding that the platinum, gold, and bronze membership tiers reflected services and access to delegations rather than visas. Damascus Chamber member Ayman Daqqaq argued that tying visa facilitation to costly membership categories shut out the small and medium traders who make up most of the business community, and demanded that the council publish its fees, who collects them, and how they are spent.

SCBC Executive Director Laith al-Rikabi said the Chinese consulate had agreed to issue only a very limited number of visas, and that the council had decided to separate its visa service from membership and offer it to all traders through the chambers of commerce. Damascus Chamber chairman Issam Ghreiwati said he had visited the Chinese embassy months earlier with Federation of Syrian Chambers of Commerce head Alaa al-Ali, described the file as having “political dimensions,” and said Beijing had promised to ease visas for specific categories of traders within six months. Chamber board member Hamza al-Jabban proposed that Chinese firms hold specialised exhibitions inside Syria every 20 days, which he said would let 70–80% of Syrian traders deal with Chinese counterparts without travelling.

Government contacts with Chinese companies continued through October, nearly all at the exploratory stage. Ali met Chinese investors on September 30 to discuss joint projects, and on October 1, Chinese Ambassador Shi Hongwei wrote in Al-Thawra that China was ready to do what it could to support Syria’s economic and social development. On October 11, Deputy Minister of Economy and Industry Basel Abdul Hannan met a delegation from Hebei-based Qinhuangdao Shihaidayi Glass at the Aleppo Industry Directorate to discuss a direct investment or strategic partnership, and the company said it first wanted to assess the potential. Deputy Agriculture Minister for Plant Production Mustafa Zakiyeh discussed reclaiming Badia and degraded land and treating soil salinity with Chinese firm San Yuan Gong Sheng, and the two sides agreed to hold technical meetings and form joint teams to select sites for field trials.

The exception came in Raqqa, where on October 13, Governor Abdul Rahman Salameh attended the launch of a cement plant in Ain Issa, and SANA reported the laying of a foundation stone. Al-Hassan Holding Group board member Ibrahim al-Issa said the plant would produce 7,000 tons of cement and 5,000 tons of clinker a day, the capacity of the project the group agreed in April with China’s Jiangsu Pengfei Group, with 300–350 Chinese and Turkish experts working on construction. Mahmoud al-Najras, a member of the governorate’s executive office, put the cost at over USD 200 million.

Data from China’s General Administration of Customs (GACC) extracted by The Syria Dispatch show Chinese exports to Syria of USD 1.27 billion in January–September 2026, more than triple the USD 367.7 million of the same period in 2025, against Syrian exports to China of USD 1.4 million. September alone accounted for USD 292.0 million, the highest monthly figure since at least January 2016 and almost double the previous peak of USD 152.1 million in August 2018.

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Why It Matters: The government’s courtship of Chinese capital has so far produced more paper than projects, which is not in itself a failure, since most agreements signed since May 2025 are frameworks rather than investment commitments. The Federation of Chambers’ July memorandum with the SCBC covers forums, information exchange, and training. In June, the Higher Education Ministry described its memorandum with Nanjing EOTO as a framework for cooperation, with projects still needing legal and technical approval. The smart industrial cities centre launched in Changshu in June promised furniture cities in Aleppo and Damascus as its first phase, yet the Aleppo site was still on a Chinese delegation’s itinerary of potential investment sites in November.

The deals that look like actual investments have delivered little so far. The 20-year concession over the Hassia and Adra free zones was signed in May 2025 with Fidi Contracting, which the ports authority itself described as an agent for another Chinese firm, and the scarcity of public information about the company prompted questions about who was behind the deal. The Syrian Company for Automotive Industry (SCAI), owned by the Syrian Sovereign Fund, signed a strategic partnership with Yutong in July without disclosing a site, capacity, value, or timeline. The USD 500 million Hassia package with Zhong was presented as a plan to allocate land. The one project to have broken ground is the Ain Issa cement plant, agreed in April 2026 between Al-Hassan Holding Group and Jiangsu Pengfei Group, a firm that describes itself as a cement equipment manufacturer; Chinese experts will work on its construction alongside Turkish ones. As far as has been reported, its Chinese contribution is equipment and expertise rather than capital.

Yet, while large projects have yet to materialise, given that capital-intensive projects take time for technical licensing, equipment transport, regulatory clearances, and legal structuring, as well as viable financial channels, the Syrian-Chinese economic relationship, judged by its momentum, seems to be headed in the right direction.

But while slow construction can be explained, the fact that the Yutong deal still has no disclosed site or the Fidi concession has no reported activity 18 months on remains unclear. The Syrian-Chinese Economic Development Forum on November 3–4 may offer a first answer: a delegation of 16 Chinese companies attended, was received by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, and toured potential project sites.

Trade, which looks more promising than the bilateral agreements, has more than tripled independently from the council, and the composition of Chinese exports shows who is driving it. Lithium-ion batteries, inverters, passenger cars, tyres, and fabrics are what households and small businesses buy to compensate for an unreliable grid and years of suppressed imports. These are the goods moved by the importers who told the council in October that they cannot get visas, cannot pay suppliers through a bank, and cannot afford its membership tiers.

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