This article is part of the August 2026 edition of the Syria Monthly Economic Digest. Click here to explore the full edition.
Key Developments: Around 100 traders and workers in the second-hand clothing trade, locally known as bala (بالة), demonstrated outside the customs building in Raqqa on the morning of Sunday, August 16, against the General Authority for Land and Sea Ports (GALSP) decision banning the import, sale, purchase and circulation of used clothing inside Syria, and demanded the release of detained traders and the cancellation of fines. Leading up to the protests, the customs police had imposed substantial fines on a number of Raqqa traders, with individual cases cited by traders including a fine of USD 1,080 levied after the sale of a single 40-kilogram bundle, a fine of roughly USD 7,500 demanded from a detained trader whose goods were valued at around USD 700, and a single case reported at approximately USD 460,000 on confiscated goods.
These latest developments come as enforcement of the prohibition tightened over the summer, concentrated in the northeast, as a direct product of institutional unification rather than the tariff alone. Traders say a March 2025 ban on the import of second-hand clothing was not applied in the Northeast in the same way as the rest of Syria, because the region was then administered by Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) institutions and imports continued through the Semalka crossing with Iraqi Kurdistan under the commercial arrangements applied there. Imports stopped once the Syrian government took over administration of Raqqa in January 2026, leaving wholesalers holding stock brought in beforehand and with the GALSP requiring Raqqa traders to re-clear warehouse stock previously cleared through AANES channels. Traders reported that fines and seizures began without prior warning or any transitional period to liquidate existing inventory, and asked for an inventory of pre-decision stock and permission to sell it down. The effects have extended to Hasakah, where shipments can no longer cross the crossings and shops on the city’s Bala Street have closed or switched to selling new clothing.
In the Raqqa governorate alone, people working in the trade estimated that around 30 wholesale outlets and between 500 and 600 retail shops sell second-hand clothing, while roughly 1,500 households privately buy bundles of clothes for resale to supplement income. Local traders say the price gap explains demand for second-hand clothing: a used pair of trousers sells for about USD 1.5 against roughly USD 10 for a locally manufactured equivalent, and used footwear of reasonable quality sells for around USD 10 against USD 30 to 40 for new domestic shoes. Furthermore, traders in Hasakah argue that local factories currently produce neither the volume nor the quality needed at prices matching household incomes.
The decision to ban the import of second-hand clothing stems from Syria’s new harmonized customs tariff, as issued under Decree 110 of 2026 and in force from June 1, 2026, which places used clothing outside the ordinary duty structure altogether. In the tariff schedule reviewed by The Syria Dispatch, heading number 6309 (the international code for ‘used clothing and other used articles’) carries the entry “negative list“ in the import-duty, service-fee and total columns, rather than a rate, in contrast with the neighboring textile headings 6306 to 6308, which are themselves assigned an import duty.
Why It Matters: The prohibition on importing second-hand clothing sits at the end of a sequence of reversals dating back to the early years of the conflict. In late 2013, the former Deputy-Minister of Economy Abdel Salam Ali framed the decision as not wanting Syria to become “the world’s garbage disposal,” but also to protect the local textile industry. In July 2018, the then Ministry of Internal Trade, led by Abdallah Al-Gharbi, reaffirmed the decision, arguing that imports were already prohibited and that the trade harmed national industry.
In areas under the former Assad regime's control until December 2024, the import ban was, on paper at least, still in full force. Following the transition, however, enforcement lapsed, but the new government then reimposed an import ban at the start of March 2025, again citing the need to protect the national garment industry. In the intervening period, the trade was in practice taxed rather than eliminated: traders in Idlib reported paying duties of USD 4,000 per ton on imported used clothing by August 2025, while Damascus traders described charges of USD 2 to 4 per kilogram in December 2025, raising the landed cost of a bundle from about USD 150 to over USD 250. Domestic manufacturers have continued to press for restrictions, with garment producers in Hama describing inflows of baled clothing and cheap imported ready-made garments as unfair competition in July 2026.
This sequence marked prohibition, collapse of enforcement, prohibition again, then taxation in practice, then a tariff line marked “negative list” provides an interesting read on the state of Syrian trade administration as much as on the current state of used clothing. Each reversal followed a change in who controlled the relevant territory and the relevant customs post, rather than a change in policy reasoning. The Northeast illustrates the point most sharply. Under the AANES, Damascus’ March 2025 ban had no effect. When it was, the rule arrived seemingly without the transition that would normally accompany extending a legal regime into territory where a different one had been in force. This sudden change led traders to account retroactively for stock that was lawfully cleared under the authority that governed them at the time.
While the rationale is clear, and the stated beneficiary is the domestic garment industry—which faces real cost pressures and has been calling for protection—the immediate cost falls on low-income households and on a retail and resale network that, in Raqqa alone, includes several hundred shops and roughly 1,500 families selling clothing from home. Banning used clothing is likely to push up the effective cost of clothing for these families several-fold, at a time when local production is not, according to traders in Hasakah, in a position to replace it at comparable prices.
Beyond the price paid by consumers, enforcement against traders has also been strict and, at times, appears disproportionate to the transactions involved: as mentioned, roughly USD 7,500 demanded on goods worth about USD 700, and USD 1,080 on the sale of a single bundle. Detaining retail traders and seizing vehicles carrying small quantities between the city and the countryside also places much of the burden on the least consequential participants in the chain.
If the policy objective is to stop used clothing from entering Syria, the most effective point of intervention would be at the border, rather than at the shop. Mirrored bilateral trade data suggest that Syrian imports of used clothing did not stop after March 2025 (see table below), indicating that the issue may lie at customs centers themselves. Yet, when budget disclosures show that customs duties accounted for 40% of state revenues in the first half of 2026, compared with just 9% from taxes, it is easy to understand why the government might have an incentive to maintain import flows across a wide range of products (READ: Finance Ministry Publishes First-Half Results as Spending Outruns a Recovering Revenue Base).
In fact, placing items on an unclear “negative list” itself leaves room for inconsistent enforcement. No published source sets out what the marking obliges customs officers to do, and the material accompanying Presidential Decree No. 110 of 2026 does not define it. It is widely understood as a prohibition and, for some headings, appears to be absolute. According to first-hand accounts from Damascus gathered by The Syria Dispatch, musical instruments, which also appear on the “negative list”, are indeed prohibited from being imported into the country.
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