This article is part of the August 2026 edition of the Syria Monthly Economic Digest. Click here to explore the full edition.
Key Developments: The Syrian Grain Corporation (SGC) announced on August 5 that it had taken in 2.7 million tons of wheat from farmers this season, above the 2.55 million tons it treats as Syria’s annual requirement. SGC Deputy Director General Ahmad Qadoun said the next day that Syria would need no imports this season, and that it last achieved wheat self-sufficiency in 2010, when pre-war output stood at around 4.1 million tons. Qadoun separately clarified that the 2.7 million-ton figure measures deliveries to state collection centers, not total national production.
Yet other figures suggest confusion over Syria’s total wheat requirement: a Ministry of Agriculture official put annual needs closer to 4 million tons in 2026, with the gap covering non-bread uses such as seed, feed, and bulgur, as the 2.7 million-ton figure relates only to Arabic bread. But even regarding bread, the matter is not that simple.
Procurement data through mid-July split the crop into 54.4% soft wheat and 45.6% durum, which, applied to the full 2.7 million tons and measured against the 80/20 soft-to-durum blend used for Arabic bread, implies a soft wheat shortfall of roughly 570,000 tons alongside a durum surplus of roughly 720,000 tons, as set out in our standalone analysis this month. Moreover, despite Mr Qadoun’s claims that wheat imports will not be necessary, imports have continued regardless: a shipment arrived at Tartous Berth 4 on August 11, in the first vessels handled there after the berth’s handover from Russian forces.
As for the harvest itself, Ministry of Agriculture data put the area sown at roughly 1.4 million hectares with expected output above 3 million tons, against 934,183 tons in 2025, when drought pushed rainfed areas almost entirely out of production (actual rainfed output that year was 29,000 tons against a planned 800,000). The Ministry fully executed its 2026 Agricultural Plan, with average yields above 3,000 kg per hectare on irrigated land and around 1,800 kg on rainfed land. Hasakeh accounts for about 37% of output, followed by Raqqa and Aleppo at 18% each and Deir Ezzor at 11%; Hasakeh alone had marketed 1.15 million tons by August 2.
Still, following up on July’s story of unpaid dues, payment continued to lag well behind procurement. To facilitate the transfer of wheat dues, the Agricultural Cooperative Bank (ACB) issued a circular on August 13 directing branches to transfer 25% of farmers’ net dues to their Sham Cash accounts, with the remaining 75% to be paid under existing procedures (via ACB branches). The circular said the measure was necessary because the Central Bank of Syria (CBS) lacked the liquidity to settle grain values in full. SGC Director General Hassan Othman said new SYP 35 billion had been transferred in a first tranche (USD 265 million), followed by new SYP 65 billion (USD 492 million)—together the full new SYP 100 billion (USD 757 million) allocated for procurement, against a bill of roughly new SYP 148.5 billion (USD 1.12 billion) calculated from the official price of new SYP 55,000 per ton for 2.7 million tons.
While some invoices are already being settled, the director of one of the ACB’s Hasakah branches, Azzou al-Hamed, said instructions concerning Sham Cash had not yet reached the branch, as his branch began settling invoices up to new SYP 1 million (old SYP 100 million; around USD 7,576) in cash in a single payment, while larger invoices are to be paid in four equal monthly installments. This scheme appears simpler than the three-tier schedule reported in July, which required an initial payment plus three installments for invoices between 1 and 5 million. Nevertheless, the Sham Cash mechanism proved unpopular among farmers who objected to it on three points: the 25% share is too small to clear debts that fell due in mid-July, older farmers often hold no account and cannot use the application, and cashing out requires travel to agents, with some fearing undisclosed deductions.
Alongside the complications of delayed payments, two relief measures were issued. On August 9, the finance and agriculture ministers agreed to extend repayment of non-performing agricultural loans by three months under Presidential Decree No. 70 of 2026, and to direct the ACB toward concessional lending for modern irrigation, machinery, and solar systems. On August 24, the Drought and Natural Disaster Mitigation Fund approved compensation of SYP 112 million for around 1,700 farmers in Idlib, Aleppo, Quneitra, and Tartous—the first three included for the first time—for flood, storm, and waterspout damage. While reports did not specify the denomination, the scale implies new SYP (around USD 830,000, or roughly USD 490 per farmer). The agriculture minister also instructed officials to complete the parallel compensation file for Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, and Hasakeh (at the time of writing, it is unclear how much has been allocated for compensation in these three governorates).
Why It Matters: This month’s obvious point of contention remains the routing of a quarter of farmers’ dues through Sham Cash, thereby extending a payment channel whose ownership and governance remain unclear into a new and large constituency. The application was adopted as a vehicle for public-sector salary payments in early 2025 without a publicly disclosed CBS license, if any. The matter, which escalated into a dispute over Sham Cash’s licensing and its approval for government use, was reportedly among the undisclosed factors behind the removal of Abdel Qader Husrieh as Central Bank governor in May and the appointment of Mohammed Safwat Raslan (a change covered in the May edition of this digest). Still, Sham Cash announced in July that it would align with newly-issued CBS requirements ahead of the issuance on August 18 of Decision 1124, adopting a national electronic payment and digital transformation system.
In practice, however, Sham Cash’s expansion to include the payment of farmers’ dues has led farmers to fear undisclosed deductions—despite Sham Cash capping withdrawal commissions at three per thousand (0.3%)—, especially as the AGC takes no fees. These fears may well be justified, as agents have reportedly been informally charging 1–2% per withdrawal. The fact that not all farmers may have Sham Cash accounts raises additional questions about how they will withdraw their dues. Finally, now that farmers are getting paid through Sham Cash, each expansion of the platform’s user base, first with public sector employees, enlarges a payments monopoly ahead of the regulatory framework meant to govern it, rather than after it.
Qamishli protest flyer calling for the expedited payment of dues owed to farmers for the wheat harvest (via Alexander McKeever (Twitter/X), read his publication on Northeast Syria).
It is also worth noting that the timing compounds a second squeeze. Farmers are being pushed toward electronic payment during the withdrawal of the old currency, as covered in the July edition, when physical notes are already scarce—and the circular itself cites the Central Bank’s lack of liquidity as the reason for the Sham Cash share.
The liquidity shortfall matters most because of when it falls in the agricultural year. Syrian winter wheat is sown from roughly November, with land preparation, seed, fertilizer, and fuel purchases concentrated in September and October. Farmers who deliver in June and receive their first installment in August, with the balance spread over four months, will be buying next season’s inputs before being paid for this year’s crop. Those who financed the 2026 crop on supplier credit face creditors who may want settlement in full rather than in installments and may not extend credit again. A plausible outcome is reduced planted area or a shift to cheaper, lower-yield practices in the same eastern governorates that produced this year’s recovery.
That points to a design problem rather than a one-off cash shortage. The state committed to buying an open-ended quantity at a fixed price without securing financing proportionate to a good harvest—the same announcement–delivery gap identified in the July edition, when the allocated new SYP 100 billion was already visibly short of the bill.
All of these challenges will be felt most acutely in the Northeast, which produces the most wheat, at a key political moment. Indeed, this is the first procurement season run under the integration agreement. While Damascus is effectively arguing that centralized administration produces better outcomes than the arrangements it replaced, the current challenges might shatter this claim. Farmers in those governorates protesting outside government buildings over unpaid dues make that argument harder to sustain.
Finally, the self-sufficiency claim is also a questionable objective to organize policy around. As set out in our standalone analysis, Syria produces more durum than its bread requirement absorbs and less soft wheat, which it has historically managed through trade—exporting the surplus at a premium and importing what it lacked. Rainfall did most of the work this year, and three-quarters of cultivated land remains rainfed in a country where drought years are becoming more frequent, not less.
The credibility cost is separate and avoidable, especially given that wheat arrived at Tartous on August 11, days after officials said no imports would be needed. The cargo may well relate to a pre-existing contract or to varieties outside the Grain Corporation’s purchases, but a headline declaration followed by visible imports invites the conclusion that the declaration was overstated.
Continue Reading the August 2026 Syria Monthly Economic Digest
Explore Previous Editions
Browse every edition of the Syria Monthly Economic Digest, featuring monthly analysis of Syria’s political economy, governance, reconstruction, and regional developments.
Never Miss an Issue
Receive the Syria Monthly Economic Digest, along with original research, expert interviews, and in-depth analysis on Syria’s political economy, governance, and reconstruction—delivered directly to your inbox.